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At Debt’s Door: What Can We Learn from
Argentina’s Recent Debt Crisis and
Restructuring?
Alan Cibils & Rubén Lo Vuolo1
Argentina’s spectacular December 2001 economic crash and default were
the culmination of a debt-led development process that began in the late
1970s. Much has been written about the crisis and its causes, and many
interpretations have been put forth as to why it occurred.

Despite

overwhelming empirical evidence to the contrary, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the financial establishment still claim that the
root cause of Argentina’s crisis was the public sector’s inability to reduce
its deficit.2

Other explanations have included the more esoteric “debt

intolerance” concept, or that the default itself was the cause of Argentina’s
2002 economic collapse.3
This paper argues that none of these explanations hold up under scrutiny.
Rather, the December 2001 default and economic crisis were the logical
outcome of a massive debt accumulation process which resulted from two
main factors. First, the negative effects of policy prescriptions by the
international financial institutions (IFIs), particularly the IMF and the
World Bank (WB), enthusiastically implemented by Argentine officials. In
other words, US-trained Argentine officials and IFI staff acted like a team
in which there was a high degree of agreement on the economic policies to
be implemented. Second, a series of exogenous shocks which ranged from
US interest rate hikes to financial crises in Asia, Russia, and, finally, Brazil.
These shocks led to spiraling costs of public sector borrowing and to
massive capital flight as the system unraveled.
The combination of inconsistent macroeconomic policies and exogenous
shocks led to an economic collapse of historical proportions in December
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2001.4 While the Argentine fixed exchange rate regime had managed to
survive the Mexican and Asian financial crises, the Brazilian crisis proved
too much for an economy straining under the effects of an overvalued
currency.

A recession set in during the last quarter of 1998 and that

recession was to become a depression. By the end of the depression in the
second quarter of 2002, Argentina had lost almost 20 percent of its GDP.5
Under these conditions, and as a result of the exponential growth of
Argentina’s public debt, this paper argues that sovereign default was not
only a logical consequence, it was also a necessity. Given the three-yearlong economic recession, economic reactivation would have been uncertain,
and perhaps impossible, in the absence of such a default. Also fundamental
to economic recovery was the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate
regime; the result allowed for a more realistic set of relative prices.6
Section I of this paper will provide a description of the main reasons
behind Argentina’s debt accumulation for the 1990–2001 period. Section II
will evaluate the central role played by the IMF both before and after the
2001–2002 crisis. Section III will briefly discuss issues surrounding the
actual costs of Argentina’s sovereign default. Section IV will address the
main issues surrounding Argentina’s debt-restructuring process. This paper
will then conclude with a list of lessons that can be drawn from Argentina’s
experience with debt, default, and the IMF.

I. THE 1990S: ORTHODOX REFORMS AND EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF
PUBLIC DEBT IN ARGENTINA
The origins of Argentina’s debt troubles can be traced back to the 1976
military dictatorship. When the military took power, Argentina’s public
debt totaled approximately $8 billion.7 By the time the military left seven
years later, the public debt had more than quintupled to $45 billion.8
However, the latest chapter in Argentina’s debt-accumulation saga began in
1989, when Carlos Menem was elected president in the midst of substantial
social unrest and economic instability brought on by very high inflation
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rates. Menem had campaigned on a traditional populist discourse, promising
higher wages and a “productive revolution.”

Campaign discourse

notwithstanding, as soon as Menem took office it became clear that his
policies would be diametrically opposed to those he had promised just
weeks earlier. During 1989 and 1990, two different economy ministers
made unsuccessful attempts to reduce high inflation and economic
turbulence.9

These attempts included a series of orthodox fiscal and

monetary policy measures, such as a freely floating exchange rate, a radical
reduction of fiscal spending, and the first privatization of state enterprises.
Additionally, debt-service payments on Argentina’s public debt, which had
been in a virtual state of default since 1988, were resumed.10
Partly as a result of these policies, there was another hyperinflationary
episode toward the end of 1990.11 Consequently, in early 1991 Menem
appointed Domingo Cavallo, a Harvard-trained economist, as economy
minister.

Cavallo promptly implemented a radical, Washington

Consensus12 (WC)-inspired stabilization and economic restructuring
program known as the Convertibility Plan. The main components of this
plan were the following: (1) trade liberalization; (2) financial and capital
account liberalization, including equal treatment for foreign and domestic
capital; (3) privatization of all state-owned enterprises; (4) prohibition
against printing money unless backed by dollars in the Central Bank’s
reserves; and (5) pegging of the peso to the dollar by law, on a one-to-one
exchange rate.
The Convertibility Plan’s primary stated objective was to reign in
inflation and to provide a strong anchor for expectation formation.13
However, the plan’s unstated objectives went much further. Over the next
decade the plan would produce a profound transformation on the Argentine
economy and society that would definitively dismantle what was left of the
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) era Welfare State.

In other

words, state enterprises, utilities, and social security were all to be
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privatized, state intervention in the economy was to be drastically reduced,
and health and education were to be decentralized.
The success of the Convertibility Plan hinged upon attracting foreign
capital inflows. The hope was that foreign capital flows would set off a
“virtuous cycle” of economic growth and general welfare improvements for
the population (through “trickle down” effects), which would then lead to
further investment flows and so on.14 Solving the public debt problem was
seen as key to attracting foreign capital.15 Therefore, a “once-and-for-all
solution” to the debt problem was devised. Official faith in this strategy
was such that Minister Cavallo stated in 1993 that “the public debt will be
insignificant by the end of the century.”16
The “once-and-for-all solution” consisted of two main parts. The first
component of the solution to the debt problem consisted of allowing
privatization of state enterprises to be purchased partly with Argentine
public debt bonds.17 This was the case for the national telephone company,
Entel, and the national airline, Aerolíneas Argentinas.18 This operation
greatly favored holders of Argentine debt, since they were given full credit
for bonds that were trading at 15–20 percent of their nominal value on the
open market.19
The second component of the solution to Argentina’s debt problem came
with the Brady Agreement, signed in December of 1992. According to this
agreement, Argentina would swap its $21 billion debt to commercial banks,
plus $8.3 billion in late payments, for 30-year Brady bonds with lower
interest rates and an average capital reduction of 35 percent.20 The main
result of this swap, illustrated in Table 1 below, was the atomization of
Argentina’s creditors from a few Northern commercial banks to hundreds of
thousands or millions of bondholders around the world.
How permanent was this solution to Argentina’s debt problem? The data
in Table 1 shows that Argentina’s public debt continued to grow at an
alarming rate throughout the 1990s, reaching explosive levels toward the
end of the decade when the much publicized default occurred.21 Perhaps
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the main result of the Brady bond swap was that Argentina was able to
regain access to financial markets.22 Renewed access to these markets
enabled the debt accumulation process that eventually resulted in the largest
sovereign default in history.
What were the reasons behind this explosive debt accumulation? Perhaps
the most widespread explanation given for Argentina’s December 2001 debt
crisis is that the country was unable to reign in its runaway fiscal spending
and therefore needed to borrow increasingly large sums to both finance its
deficit (since, by law, Argentina was unable to finance itself by printing
money) and to service its rapidly accumulating debt. For example,
according to Anoop Singh, the IMF’s former Western Hemisphere Director,
“failures in fiscal policy constitute the root cause of the . . . crisis.”23 This
view continues to be voiced by high ranking IMF officials and is mentioned
repeatedly in the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office report on the IMF’s
role in the Argentine crisis.24 Many orthodox economists, in Argentina and
abroad, and much of the business media support this view as well.
When examined against actual data, however, the contention that
Argentina’s spiraling debt was caused by runaway fiscal spending or debt
intolerance becomes untenable. Based on available data, three main causes
emerge for Argentina’s 1990s debt buildup. First was the growth in debt
service due to external shocks.

Second was the privatization of social

security. Third was the growth of private sector demand for foreign
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Table 1: Evolution of Argentina's Public Debt Stock (1990-2001) (in millions of period-end dollars)
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exchange, created by the very nature of the previously discussed economic
restructuring program known as the Convertibility Plan.
A. Growth in Debt Service Due to External Shocks
It is difficult to find evidence that the government’s fiscal policy played a
significant role in bringing about the December 2001 debt crisis. Table 2,
seen below, shows the central government’s revenue, spending, interest
payments, and primary and overall budget deficit or surplus from 1993–
2001. Although the government budget does move from a surplus of 2.7
billion pesos in 1993 (1.2 percent of GDP) to a peak deficit of 8.7 billion
pesos by 2001 (3.2 percent of GDP), this worsening of the fiscal balance is
not a result of increases in government spending.
Rather, the worsening of the fiscal balance can be explained by the
country being hit with a series of exogenous interest-rate shocks that caused
a debt spiral and, eventually, a default.25 The shocks that hit Argentina can
be seen from the data on the government’s primary balance26 in Table 2,
below. The primary balance moves from a surplus of 5.6 billion pesos (2.4
percent of GDP) in 1993 to a surplus of 1.5 billion (0.5 percent of GDP) in
2001.

But this worsening of the primary balance was not a result of

government decisions to increase spending. Primary spending was 19.1
percent of GDP in 1993, and 18.6 percent for 2001. Rather, Argentina
became stuck in a debt spiral in which higher interest rates increased the
debt and the country’s risk premium.

Argentina’s unrestricted capital

mobility and currency board system—a deadly combination—made it
impossible for the country to withstand the external shocks. A recession
that would become a depression began in late 1998, substantially eroding
economic activity and fiscal revenues.

The government’s response,

following IMF prescriptions, was to implement increasingly orthodox
economic policies, which only deepened the recession. This combination
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Table 2: National Government Spending and Revenue (1993-2001) (in millions of current pesos)
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of policies and events led to ever-higher interest rates and debt-service
payments until default became all but inevitable in December of 2001.
Some economists have argued that the economy could have adjusted to
and recovered from the external shocks, if only wages had fallen enough:
If Argentina had a more flexible economic system, especially in its
labor markets, its economy would have been more able to adapt to
the rigors of the Convertibility Plan; unemployment would have
been lower; growth would have been stronger; fiscal deficits would
have been smaller; and interest rates would have been lower because
creditors would have had more confidence in the capacity of the
Argentine government to service its obligations.27
Any macroeconomic policy regime that requires such a fall in nominal
wages is, as a practical matter, untenable. Theoretical and political issues
aside, suggesting a drop in wages as the solution to the Argentine recession
shows a profound lack of knowledge of the workings of the Argentine labor
market. Regardless of what the labor legislation says, in reality, virtually
half of all employment is informal, with no benefits and substantially lower
wages than the formal sector.28 In other words, the Argentine labor market
has had a high degree of flexibility for almost a decade, rendering the
argument of lower wages irrelevant.
Considering the array of problematic policies already in place, it is also
difficult to imagine any fiscal policy—assuming it were even politically
possible to cut enormous amounts of government spending—that could
have avoided the December 2001 crisis. The overvalued currency, the size
and growth of Argentina’s debt (mostly denominated in foreign currency)
relative to export earnings, and the free mobility of capital all contributed to
the inevitable crisis that materialized in 2001.
B. Privatization of Social Security
Another main cause for Argentina’s 1990s debt buildup is the Argentine
government’s decision in 1994 to privatize the public pay-as-you-go social
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security system that had been in existence since 1967.29 This decision was
strongly promoted and supported by the World Bank and the IMF and had a
major impact on Argentina’s fiscal accounts.30 As Table 3 shows, the lost
revenue, plus accumulated interest costs, amounted to nearly the entire
government budget deficit in 2001.31

Table 3: The Fiscal Impact of Social Security Privatization (percent of GDP)
1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

Lost Soc. Sec. Rev. -0.5%

-1.0%

-1.0%

-1.0%

-1.0%

-1.0%

-1.0%

-1.0%

Interest Rate

10%

10%

10%

10%

14%

14%

20%

20%

Interest Costs

-0.01%

-0.10%

-0.20%

-0.30%

-0.60%

-0.86%

-1.59%

-2.16%

Additional Deficit -0.51%

-1.10%

-1.20%

-1.30%

-1.59%

-1.86%

-2.59%

-3.16%

Cumulative Debt -0.51% -1.62%
Source: Baker and Weisbrot

-2.72%

-3.83%

-5.35%

-7.50% -10.05% -13.49%

The reason social security privatization had such a substantial impact on
government accounts is really quite simple and should have been easily
predicted. The government lost most of the social security contribution
revenues, which, following privatization, were funneled to the private
pension funds. However, the government’s expenditures on social security
remained the same, as all of the retirees on the pay-as-you-go system
continued to collect their pensions from the government. In this way, a
substantial gap was created which, according to the data in Table 3,
amounted to 1 percent of GDP each year between 1995 and 2001.
Due to restrictions on deficit financing imposed by the Convertibility
Plan, the government’s options were to either increase revenues, radically
lower expenditures, or borrow to cover the gap. The government resorted
mainly to borrowing, which contributed to the debt spiral.32 This increased
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borrowing, coupled with the external shocks described earlier, produced an
explosive debt accumulation process that collapsed in December 2001.33
C. The Balance of Payments: Demand for Foreign Exchange
A third cause for Argentina’s debt buildup can be found in the very
nature of the convertibility regime itself, which created a growing demand
for foreign exchange from both the public and private sectors. The public
sector demand for foreign exchange was based on two needs: (1) the need to
keep Central Bank reserves equivalent to pesos in circulation (as per the
Convertibility Law), and (2) the need to make debt-service payments that
were primarily in foreign exchange.34 Private sector demand for foreign
exchange resulted from a need to finance imports, which, given the
overvalued peso, resulted in a growing trade imbalance. This was only
reversed during the recessionary periods.35 The private sector also showed
a growing preference for the dollar over the peso, as witnessed by
increasing dollar-denominated bank deposits and the dollarization of many
economic transactions.36
As a result, throughout the 1990s, both the private and public sector had
negative current account balances.

The only way to ensure a current

account surplus was through sustained capital account surpluses. While
foreign direct investment partially satisfied this need, overall it proved
insufficient to meet the demand for foreign exchange.37 As a result, the
foreign exchange gap was covered with both public and private debt.
Starting in the mid 1990s, increasing capital flight worsened this
situation, resulting in a growing private current account deficit, as shown in
Table 4.

According to several authors,38 the private foreign exchange

deficit was covered with public sector reserve accumulation, due primarily
to new debt issues. As a result, private behavior (particularly that of large
business conglomerates) worked against the survival of the convertibility
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Table 4: Disaggregated Balance of Payments Data (1992—2001)
(annual averages in millions of dollars)
1992-94
CURRENT ACCOUNT

1995-99

2000-01

Total '92-'01

-8.908

-10.654

-6.854

-9.370

Private Sector

-6.650

-6.818

-1.448

-5.694

Trade Balance

-2.633

-380

5.033

27

-913

-2.515

-2.411

-2.013

-3.104

-3.924

-4.070

-3.707

-2.258

-3.836

-5.406

-3.677

-2.141

-3.728

-5.322

-3.571

-117

-108

-84

-106

11.842

13.711

2.761

10.960

8.595

4.902

-5.309

3.968

Foreign Direct Investment

4.783

10.602

7.428

8.221

Portfolio and Other Investment

4.097

-548

-5.814

-208

Capital Flight

-3.772

-9.935

-6.170

-7.333

Foreign Debt

3.487

4.783

-753

3.287

Public Sector

3.247

8.809

8.071

6.993

Foreign Debt

3.247

8.809

8.071

6.993

2.934

3.056

-4.093

1.590

1.945

-1.916

-6.758

-1.726

989

4.973

2.665

3.316

Financial Services
Real and Other Services
Public Sector
Financial Services
Real and Other Services
CAPITAL ACCOUNT
Private Sector

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
Private Sector
Public Sector
Source: Kulfas and Schorr (2003)
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regime, which subsisted as long as it did thanks to continued public
indebtedness.39
In sum, a combination of exogenous shocks, privatization of the social
security system, and capital flight were the main factors responsible for the
debt buildup of the 1990s. These problems were compounded by both the
economic recession that began in the third quarter of 1998, which later
became a full-fledged depression, and the recessionary fiscal policies that
the government implemented at the behest of the IMF.
D. Debt Intolerance?
Some have argued recently that Argentina may suffer from “debt
intolerance,” given that it has “serially defaulted” on its debt throughout its
almost two hundred-year history.40 According to this argument, the default
and crisis are due to economic characteristics acquired over two centuries
and to the government’s irresponsibility in borrowing beyond its level of
“debt tolerance.”41 Damill has convincingly argued against this view.42
The country’s remote past is, for all practical purposes, irrelevant to the
current situation. It is hard to argue that Argentina’s financial crisis in the
late 1800s had any direct bearing upon the crisis of 2001. By placing the
emphasis on the remote past, proponents of the “debt intolerance” theory
tend to ignore the very real policy mistakes of the 1990s that had a direct
bearing on debt accumulation and the subsequent default.
Be that as it may, it is interesting that financial markets—which actually
loan the money—completely ignored the notion of debt intolerance in the
Argentine case, lending far beyond the level that Reinhart has suggested.43
Furthermore, the IMF itself ignored the notion of debt intolerance in
Argentina, as witnessed by its almost $10 billion loan to Argentina just
three months before the economic collapse.44

Given Argentina’s post-

default success with new debt issues, and given that the country’s debt-toGDP ratio is currently greater than 80 percent, it would appear that
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financial markets still do not consider debt intolerance to be a relevant
concept.45

II. THE IMF AND POLICY FORMULATION IN ARGENTINA
Following the Argentine financial meltdown, the IMF went to
considerable lengths to show that Argentine officials were entirely to blame
for the collapse of the Convertibility Plan.46 However, as will be shown, the
IMF had substantially participated in Argentina’s macroeconomic policy
formulation before, during, and after the crisis, and is therefore also
partially responsible for the economic collapse.
First, as the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) report clearly
states, the IMF supported Argentina’s policy reforms during the 1990s,
including the privatization of social security, which was the main cause of
the country’s fiscal problems, described earlier.47 IMF support was explicit,
as privatization was a condition in several of the IMF agreements with
Argentina during the 1990s.48 Further, the IMF’s invitation to President
Menem to address the Joint Annual Meetings of the Board of Governors of
the IMF and the World Bank Group in October 1998 was a clear sign of the
IMF’s approval and support for the economic policies implemented in
Argentina during the 1990s.49
Second, when the depression began in late 1998, the IMF conditioned its
financial assistance on a series of fiscal spending cuts aimed at reducing the
fiscal deficit.50 As pointed out above, the deficit was not due to increased
fiscal spending but to debt-service payments that spiraled out of control as a
result of exogenous shocks and the privatization of social security. IMFrecommended fiscal spending cuts acted procyclically, deepening the crisis
until the system collapsed. Spending cuts resulted in a drop in economic
activity, which, given Argentina’s tax structure, resulted in drops in fiscal
revenue and increases in the fiscal deficit. At that point, further fiscal
spending cuts were implemented, and so on and so forth, feeding the
economy’s downward spiral.
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Third, the IMF tripled its exposure to Argentina (from $5 billion to $15
billion) just three months before the default.51

This postponed the

Convertibility system’s collapse, thus deepening the capital flight process
that was already taking place and that eventually resulted in the December
2001 run on deposits.
However, the IMF’s participation in the Argentine crisis does not end
with the December 2001 default.

According to official Argentine

government documents, following the crisis, the IMF committed substantial
errors in three key areas: (1) diagnosing the crisis and its aftermath, (2)
making projections about the evolution of key economic variables in the
post-crisis months, and (3) making policy prescriptions.52
Among the projection errors committed by the IMF, the official
document mentions two examples.
IMF economists first ignored, and then refused to accept,
empirical evidence presented to them in June 2002 that indicated
that the drop in economic activity had bottomed out and that there
were strong signs of economic reactivation. Based on these
indications, Argentine authorities projected an 11 percent drop in
GDP for 2002. However, as late as September 2002, IMF
technical staff were projecting a GDP contraction of 16–20
percent. Actual GDP growth for 2002 was -10.9 percent.53
Then, despite the IMF’s projections of a substantial drop in
GDP, the IMF also projected a real exchange rate appreciation.
This was to be caused by real and nominal exchange rate
“overshooting,” which IMF staff believed would be substantial due
to the chaotic exit from the fixed exchange rate regime. Basically,
IMF staff believed that relative prices would continue to be very
close to what they had been during the fixed exchange rate regime.
In contrast, Argentine officials believed that due to the prolonged
recession and the abrupt interruption of capital flows, the
equilibrium real exchange rate would be substantially depreciated
compared to the convertibility real exchange rate. Actual data
proved that Argentine official projections were correct.54
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According to the Argentine official document, the IMF also generally
disregarded Argentine policy initiatives, insisting on its own policy
prescriptions.55 Given the IMF’s errors in diagnosing the crisis and its
effects, its policy prescription errors were also substantial.
•

In February 2002, after the fixed exchange rate was abandoned,
the IMF insisted on a totally free floating exchange rate regime,
which Argentine authorities implemented against their better
judgment. The IMF’s argument supporting its plan was that the
foreign exchange market would automatically reach a new
equilibrium. However, just as the Argentine authorities feared
would happen, the price of the dollar shot up because of a
speculative bubble that appeared to have no ceiling. The price
of the dollar stabilized only when Argentine authorities
implemented a “dirty float” in April 2002. The IMF, however,
rejected the dirty float exchange rate regime, arguing that the
Central Bank’s international reserves did not belong to the
country and could therefore not be freely utilized to prop up the
currency.56

•

The IMF also opposed the Argentine government’s decision to
make optional the swap of frozen bank deposits for bonds (the
swap was required to normalize the banking system). Instead,
the IMF wanted to make the swap compulsory, illustrating a
lack of comprehension of the volatile social and political
situation in Argentina during 2002. A compulsory swap would
likely have caused more social upheavals at a time when
stabilizing policies were badly needed.

•

For the financial system, the IMF recommended the same shock
treatment that had had failed in Indonesia following the 1997
Asian crisis. The IMF advised drastically reducing the number
of financial institutions, seeking an accelerated purge of the
banking system by closing down banks not deemed viable. The
government, however, preferred a gradualist approach, since the
number of banks had already dropped considerably since the
1995 Tequila crisis. The government also believed that, in time,
those financial institutions that were not viable would close on
their own.57
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•

As is the norm, the IMF continued to demand fiscal spending
cuts following the December 2001 crisis. However, the default
on much of the public debt meant that Argentina would run a
primary and overall surplus for the first time in many decades,
making spending cuts unnecessary.58

Further, the IMF went considerably beyond its mandate, making
recommendations unrelated to the IMF’s purview or areas of expertise. For
example, in the months following the crisis, the IMF called for a change in
Argentina’s bankruptcy law to remove protections for firms filing for
bankruptcy and to provide better conditions for creditors.59 The IMF also
actively lobbied for the repeal of the “economic subversion” law, under
which the government could investigate white collar crimes committed by
firms, banks, or individuals.60 At the time, the law was being used to
investigate capital flight that had violated banking restrictions implemented
during the crisis.
demands.

61

Both laws were modified according to the IMF’s

Finally, the IMF also insisted that privatized utilities be allowed

to increase fees as they saw fit.62 Utility rates had been frozen in the postcrisis months pending contract renegotiations with the privatized utilities,
due to systematic and well-documented contract violations. Despite the fact
that many of these renegotiations are still pending, many utility rates have
been steadily increasing for the last few years.63
In sum, it is clear that the IMF was partially responsible for the Argentine
crisis. The IMF actively participated in the design of the macroeconomic
policy environment that resulted in the December 2001 collapse. As a
result, Argentine authorities concluded that “the IMF’s technical staff
appears not to be totally up to the task of dealing with a situation where a
large crisis has erupted and should, therefore, give local authorities a greater
margin to formulate and implement economic policies necessary to deal
with the crisis.”64
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III. HOW COSTLY WAS SOVEREIGN DEFAULT?
Some have argued that Argentina’s default was too costly, stating that the
dramatic drop in GDP in 2002 was a direct consequence of that default.65
However, Argentina’s sovereign debt default provides arguments for a
powerful refutation of the conventional wisdom regarding the costs of
default.

The consensus among orthodox economists and experts in

international finance was that Argentina would suffer severe long-term
consequences for breaking the rules in such a spectacular way: a huge
sovereign default, combined with what was widely denounced in the
business press as a refusal to bargain with creditors, and a contentious
relationship with the IMF.66

The result, however, has been quite the

opposite.
Before considering the hypothetical costs of default, it is useful to lay out
the sequence of events in order to better understand the issues. First, by
January 2002, Argentina was in an economic depression which had begun
in the last quarter of 1998. As a result of the depression and of IMFsponsored fiscal austerity measures, it had become increasingly difficult to
balance fiscal accounts—a problem that was temporarily solved by taking
on new debt.67 Consequently, it became clear that the convertibility regime
had become unfeasible, as its continued existence hinged on increasingly
unavailable foreign capital flows. Second, the abrupt end of foreign credit
to Argentina in late 2001 resulted in the much publicized default and sealed
the fate of the convertibility regime.68 Third, the exit from the convertibility
regime in early 2002 was unplanned and disorderly.69 The currency was
initially fixed at a higher value vis-à-vis the dollar, eventually being
allowed to float freely per IMF recommendations, causing substantial
dislocation in the economy.70

When, contrary to IMF prescriptions, a

managed float was adopted for the exchange rate in late April 2002, the
economy began to emerge from the crisis.71
Given the sequence of events, it should be clear that the deepening of the
crisis in 2002 was due far more to the effects of the depression and chaotic
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exit from the fixed exchange rate regime than to the default itself.
However, even from the perspective of those that blame the default for the
crisis, the default was still the least costly option available. Further, even if
one insisted on blaming the crisis on the default, a convincing argument can
still be made that defaulting was the least costly option available. Over the
three-month period following the December 2001 default, the economy
continued to decline, losing about 6.3 percent of its GDP.72 The loss in
GDP is an upper bound for the cost of the default because it is almost
certain that, even if the best of all possible non-default solutions had been
brokered, there would still have been a further decline in GDP before the
economy recovered. In reality, the cost of Argentina’s default was almost
certainly less than zero, since any non-default solution reached at that time
would most likely have cost the country more, in terms of continued lost
output, than did the default.
Within a few months of the default, economic recovery was well under
way, and there was positive growth for the last three quarters of 2002.73
The Argentine economy grew by 8.8 percent in 2003 and by 9 percent in
2004 and 2005.74 Thus, from the perspective of “shock therapy”—a harsh
adjustment, necessary to get the economy back on a sustainable growth
path—the post-default adjustment was successful and delivered quick
results. Therefore, even if one insisted on blaming the economic crisis on
the default, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that default was the right
choice for Argentina.
In fact, even taking the worst estimate of the cost of default (6.3 percent
of GDP), it is still virtually equal to Mexico’s loss from the 1995 peso crisis
(6.2 percent of GDP), where Mexico was assisted with a $40 billion IMF
package.75 It is also substantially less than the cost of adjustment during the
Asian economic crisis, where Indonesia lost more than 13 percent of GDP.76
It is important to remember that the Argentine government received
absolutely no outside assistance during the entire crisis. Quite the opposite
occured, in fact there was a very large net drain of money out of Argentina
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to multilateral creditors.77 In 2002, as poverty and unemployment reached
record levels, and as the recovery was just getting under way, the country
made net payments totaling $4.1 billion, or more than 4 percent of the GDP,
to multilateral creditors.78 For 2003–2004, there were further net payments
of $5.9 billion.79 From a purely economic standpoint, the default seems a
success. More importantly, the economy was able to get back on a solid
growth path, something that could have taken much longer if it had retained
its crushing debt burden.
It is hard to imagine that Argentina would have done better by trying to
please the IMF and other creditors. The previous four years of depression,
as well as the demands put forward by the IMF in its protracted negotiations
with Argentina during 2002, indicate that continued stagnation and even
further decline were likely possibilities if the country had pursued tighter
monetary and fiscal policies. Also, the acceptance of an unsustainable debt
burden would have undermined the confidence of foreign investors. The
Argentine government made the best decision that it could under the
circumstances, and it probably avoided further chaos by choosing default
and rejecting IMF prescriptions.

IV. DEBT RESTRUCTURING AND BEYOND
In early 2003, it became clear that Argentina was emerging from its
political and economic crisis. As a result, the IMF and defaulted creditors
increased pressure on Argentina for a solution to its $100 billion default
debt. After intense negotiations, including two different Argentine official
debt-restucturing proposals, a debt restructuring swap was opened and a
substantial portion of the defaulted bonds were swapped.

Despite this

relative success, many questions remain regarding Argentina’s public debt
sustainability.

The following section discusses the debt-restructuring

process and its implications.
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A. Leaving the Default Behind: From Dubai to Buenos Aires
The process to emerge from default began in September 2003, when
Argentina issued a set of conditions to creditors under which it was willing
to restructure its debt.80 Conditions included a 75 percent capital reduction,
or “haircut,” considerably lower interest rates and longer maturities, and no
recognition of interest payments accrued since the default.81 Creditors were
outspokenly opposed to these restructuring conditions and demanded a
better offer.82 One of the more outspoken groups, the Global Committee of
Argentine Bond-holders (GCAB), even teamed up with the IMF to pressure
Argentina for a better deal for private creditors.83
IMF and creditor pressure resulted in a new offer on June 1, 2004.
Known as the “Buenos Aires Proposal,” the new offer represented a 100
percent improvement for defaulted creditors over the Dubai guidelines.
Interest rates were doubled, the haircut was reduced from 75 percent to
roughly 45 percent, and recognition of past-due interest since the default
was recognized as a part of the debt.84 The Buenos Aires offer, however,
was still not accepted by either the IMF or the creditors. The Argentine
government’s offer, nonetheless, was final because officials claimed that the
resulting debt-service load was the maximum the country could afford to
pay based on realistic sustainability assumptions.85 Thus, for the first time
in the history of modern defaults, the debt restructuring swap proceeded
without the explicit support of the IMF.
The debt-swap process ended on February 25, 2005, with a 76.15 percent
acceptance rate.86 This was no small accomplishment and did indeed have
several important aspects. The deal implicitly recognized the impossibility
of servicing the pre-default debt under the terms with which it was issued.
Additionally, Argentina successfully resisted substantial pressure from the
IMF and the financial establishment to improve the offer. Further, the new
bonds issued as a result of the debt restructuring were for a lower amount
and at lower interest rates, thereby improving Argentina’s debt-service
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terms over those existing prior to the default. And finally, the default was
resolved after three years of uncertainty.
Specifically, the financial results of the debt restructuring swap can be
summarized as follows:
•

Of the $81 billion in defaulted debt, $62.318 billion, or 76.15
percent, entered the debt-swap. Holders of roughly $19 billion
did not accept the terms and conditions of the swap and remain
as holdouts.87

•

For the $62.318 billion that entered the swap, the Argentine
government issued $35.261 billion in new bonds. That is, the
“haircut,” or reduction on the nominal value of the defaulted
bonds, was 43.4 percent.88

•

The maturity of the new bonds is considerably longer (up to
forty-two years) than the old bonds and the interest rates are
considerably lower. 89

•

The currency structure of the new debt also changed
considerably. A full 37 percent of the total stock of post-swap
debt is now denominated in pesos. Morever, the rate of return
on these bonds is tied to inflation, making them by far the most
profitable investment in the Argentine public debt bond pool.90

•

The debt-to-GDP ratio went from 113 percent at the time of
default in December 2001, to 72 percent after the default.
However, this does not take into account the $19 billion that did
not enter the debt-restructuring. Therefore, total debt-to-GDP
ratio is actually 87 percent when one takes holdout debt into
account.91

Accordingly, even though the capital reduction was considerably less
than the 75 percent proclaimed by the government, one can still consider the
debt restructuring to have been a success, particularly given the lack of
support from the IMF and the G7. Several factors made this result possible.
On the international front, low interest rates and a lack of good investment
options, the decreasing credibility of the IMF both within and outside the
institution, and a generalized belief that the Argentine fixed exchange rate
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regime had run its course, were all key. Another important factor was the
lack of alternatives for private creditors vis-à-vis the Argentine government
debt restructuring offer. An indication of this lack of alternatives was the
relatively high acceptance rate of the Buenos Aires Proposal by creditors
even in the face of a substantial capital reduction.
B. Troubles with the Official Approach to Debt Restructuring
The government presented the results of the debt restructuring swap as a
resounding success. The IMF, as well as the creditors owning 24 percent of
the defaulted debt who did not participate in the debt restructuring swap—
referred to as “holdouts”—claim that the default is not yet fully resolved.
While this is problematic, there are other fundamental problems that
Argentina’s post-debt-swap situation leaves unsolved.
1. Acceptance of All Pre-Default Debt as Valid
Perhaps one of the most troubling aspects of the Argentine government’s
approach to debt restructuring is that it unquestioningly accepted all predefault debt as valid.

By doing so, the official strategy ignored the

substantial irregularities committed by the military dictatorship (1976-1983)
when contracting the debt.92 The official strategy also validated all of the
financial speculation cycles and scams of the past two-and-a-half decades.
These cycles typically consisted of a period of growing private and public
indebtedness, followed by capital flight and eventually the “socialization”
of private debt (i.e., the transformation of private debt into public debt) as
the financial crisis erupted.93 These cycles were compounded by repeated
debt restructuring episodes, which turned out to be major scams in which
the financial and corporate sectors benefited greatly from overpriced bonds,
and the public sector (i.e., the taxpayers) was repeatedly and cumulatively
saddled with the costs of financial speculation.
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Critics have rightfully argued that the government should have used the
debt restructuring opportunity provided by the default to carry out a longoverdue, in-depth examination and depuration of the stock of public debt.
2. IFI Debt Unquestioned
Equally troubling is the Argentine government’s treatment of
international financial institution (IFI) debt. The official approach has been
to fully honor the approximately $32 billion debt to the IFIs without even
trying to get more favorable repayment conditions (for example, lower
interest rates and/or a longer repayment timeline). Official justification for
this approach was that G7 support was needed for the debt-swap to be
successful. In this view, to challenge the validity of IFI debt would have
been too costly and could have threatened the success of the debtrestructuring effort.
As time has shown, Argentina’s strategy regarding IFI debt failed, since
the IMF and the G7 never did back the Argentine debt-restructuring
process. As a result, the strategy on IFI debt imparted (1) a larger capital
reduction on private creditors; (2) preferential treatment to those who bear
substantial responsibility for the Argentine catastrophe; and (3) larger fiscal
surpluses (or new indebtedness) in order to face a hefty IFI debt-service
load during the next decade.
3. Paying Off the IMF: Poster Child Till the Bitter End
If the Argentine official strategy vis-à-vis IFI debt was questionable, the
strategy on IMF debt was downright scandalous.

Official debt-service

sustainability projections had been based on an agreement with the IMF that
would have provided for the rollover of 100 percent of IFI capital payments
for the foreseeable future.94 However, in order to refinance this debt, an
agreement with the IMF was necessary.

This would have required

implementing the usual list of IMF-sponsored policies, many of which were
directly responsible for the 2001 economic crisis.
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Clearly, the government could not submit to such conditionality and risk
turning the economic recovery into yet another recession. It is also clear
that Argentina had substantial leverage that it could bring to bear in its
negotiations with the Fund. With a debt of roughly $10 billion,95 Argentina
was the IMF’s third largest debtor behind Brazil and Turkey. As the old
adage goes, “if you owe the bank $10,000, you have a problem; if you owe
the bank $10 billion, the bank has a problem.”
Given this situation, the Argentine government had several options
available. First, it could have continued to service the debt with the IMF
according to the original payment schedule, as Argentina had been doing
since the last agreement failed in August 2004. Alternatively, it could have
unilaterally restructured its debt with the IMF, making its maturity equal to
that of restructured bonds (thirty-five years on average). A third option
would have been to unilaterally restructure its debt with the IMF, imposing
similar conditions to those imposed on private creditors (capital reduction,
reduction of interest rates, and substantially longer maturity).

Finally,

Argentina could have defaulted to the IMF as a way to recover some of the
losses caused by IMF blunders.
However, rather than taking any of the above options, President
Kirchner’s administration opted for a solution suggested by the IMF itself:
to pay the IMF in full, three years ahead of schedule, using Central Bank
international reserves.96

Thus, in early January 2006, the Kirchner

administration took $10 billion from the Central Bank’s international
reserves and paid off the IMF, proving that Argentina was willing to be the
IMF’s poster child until the bitter end.97 The government presented the
IMF debt cancellation as part of their desendeudamiento, or debt-reduction
strategy. In reality, Argentina’s net stock of public debt did not change,
since the Argentine Treasury had to issue new bonds in order to compensate
the Central Bank for the reserves it was taking to pay off the IMF.98
According to the government’s rhetoric, with this payment Argentina was
able to finally liberate itself from the IMF.99 While it is true that Argentina
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needed to rid itself of the IMF, and it is also true that the IMF is no longer
in the picture, this was the worst possible to way to get rid of the IMF.
Given the IMF’s shared responsibility for Argentina’s economic crisis, and
given Argentina’s ongoing high hunger, poverty, and unemployment rates,
it is questionable whether this was the best use of $10 billion.100
4. Post-Default Debt Fully Recognized
Also questionable was the official approach to the roughly $35 billion
public debt issued in the months following the default and devaluation. The
financial system entered a new crisis as a result of the 2002 devaluation and
because many bank customers had dollar-denominated loans. In order to
avoid massive bankruptcies, the government converted all loans to pesos at
the old exchange rate of one peso to one dollar, and issued bonds to the
banks for the difference between the old and the then-current nominal
exchange rates.101 In the process, the government bailed out countless large
corporations, many of which produced mostly for export markets and made
dollars in exchange—corporations that were in no risk of bankruptcy due to
the devaluation.102
However, most of this new debt is owned by the local financial system,
which explains why the official strategy was to accept all debt as legitimate
and to continue making payments on this debt as originally contracted.103
Critics have maintained that beneficiaries of this new debt issue should have
been identified and a tax levied against those who benefited unduly. This
was not done and, as a result, the Argentine taxpayer and defaulted creditors
must pay for this unnecessary corporate bailout.
C. A Heavy Burden
Many issues factor into the question of how much of a solution to
Argentina’s decade-long debt problem this latest debt-swap represents.
Clearly, much depends on the debt-service structure for the years ahead, and
on other factors such as macroeconomic performance and economic growth,
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fiscal revenue, the exchange and inflation rates, the balance of payments,
and foreign interest rates.
Table 5 contains a schedule of Argentina’s debt-service obligations for
the period 2006–2016. Before interpreting the data, it is necessary to make
some important clarifications about payments that are excluded from the
table:
•

The data assumes the January 2006 $10 billion payoff to the IMF as having
taken place and, therefore, does not include any debt-service payments to
the IMF;

•

The data does not include debt-service payments on the $10 billion in bonds
issued by the Treasury to the Central Bank in compensation for the
international reserves used to pay off the IMF;

•

The data does not include $5.3 billion that the Treasury owes the Central
Bank and is supposed to pay back in 2005;104

•

The data does not include payments for the “GDP-linked” coupons on
restructured bonds;105

•

The data does not include debt-service payments for new debt issued in
2006 or later;106

•

The data does not include payments on the roughly $24 billion holdout
debt;

•

The data does not include $2.5 billion debt to the Paris Club and other
official creditors, which is still in default and pending restructuring; and

•

The “Total” column includes payments due after 2016 but not shown in the
table.
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When added up, the data not included in Table 5 amounts to substantial
payments, making the debt-service schedule all the more onerous. Bearing
that in mind, several conclusions can be drawn based on the data in Table 5.
First, Argentina’s debt-service obligations through 2011 exceed 3 percent
of the GDP. Furthermore, through 2009, Argentina’s yearly debt-service
obligations exceed 4 percent of the GDP. Even with IMF debt service out
of the picture, the government will have to issue new debt in order to meet
its debt-service payments.

New debt issues and growth rates above 3

percent will result in heftier debt-service payments in the short- and
medium-run, which means that the debt-service load will be considerably
heavier than what Table 5 shows.
Second, Argentina’s debt-service schedule, augmented by new debt
issues, implies that the government will need to have large, sustained
primary fiscal surpluses for many years to come.

Indeed, a recent

publication by economists from the University of Buenos Aires concludes
that Argentina will have to maintain a primary surplus of 3 percent of GDP
and positive growth rates for the next twenty-five years in order to meet
debt-service payments.107 Obtaining such results would require a break
from Argentina’s two hundred-year history, since the country was never
able to achieve such macroeconomic performance on a sustained basis.
Furthermore, obtaining a primary surplus of this magnitude on a
sustained basis depends on several factors. A primary surplus depends on
high rates of growth because Argentina’s tax structure is highly dependent
on economic activity. Therefore, in order for fiscal revenue to keep up with
debt service, high rates of growth are necessary. However, high growth
rates also impact debt service since many of the restructured bonds have
“GDP-linked” coupons. A primary surplus also depends on tight control of
fiscal spending. In order to obtain and sustain a surplus, fiscal spending
must be kept in check. This means continuing to postpone public sector
wage increases and other urgent needs, such as dealing with still alarmingly
high rates of poverty, indigence, unemployment, and dealing with the
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profound crises in the education and public healthcare systems. A third
factor in obtaining a primary surplus is export growth because one-third of
fiscal revenues come from export taxes. In other words, maintaining a
primary surplus means that exports will need to continue to grow apace.
Furthermore, since two-thirds of Argentina’s public debt is denominated in
foreign currency, maintaining a trade surplus is also key to getting the
foreign exchange needed to meet debt-service payments.
Third, maintaining a trade surplus depends on being able to maintain
price competitiveness, and price competitiveness depends on being able to
maintain a competitive exchange rate and low salaries, in relative terms. In
other words, this means being able to continue to postpone long-delayed
real wage improvements for Argentine workers who have seen their income
consistently eroded in real terms for the last three decades of WC-sponsored
policies.
Fourth, inflation control is another key component of the government’s
policy agenda. Inflation has two major potential impacts with regards to
debt service. First, inflation affects consumer and investor expectations and
can eventually negatively impact economic growth. Second, 37 percent of
Argentina’s restructured public debt is denominated in domestic currency
and is linked to inflation. An increase in inflation directly impacts the
country’s debt-service commitments.

Additionally, in order to keep

inflation in check, the government’s main objective is to maintain the set of
relative prices that resulted from the maxi-devaluation that took place in
early 2002. This means keeping wages repressed—a difficult task in the
face of increased demands for redistributive policies to make up for many
years of real-wage decline.
Fifth, debt sustainability also assumes that Argentina will be able to issue
new debt, at reasonable interest rates and maturities, in order to finance
current debt service. With local banks already heavily exposed to the public
sector—roughly 50 percent of bank portfolios are in state securities—new
funding may be hard to come by.

Relying on foreign capital could
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complicate matters further, as capital inflows are generally motivated by
short-term speculative behavior, and can have destabilizing effects on the
nominal

exchange

rate—the

centerpiece

of

the

government’s

macroeconomic policy.
The overriding conclusions are simply that, in the “best case” scenario,
for the next thirty years, debt service will continue to be a dominating factor
of Argentina’s economic, social, and political life. Additionally, there is no
chance that the regressive effects of three decades of WC-sponsored
policies will be undone in the short- or medium-run. Specifically, this
means postponing redistributive policies, not dealing with highly
concentrated and unequal power structures within the economy, and not
dealing with still alarmingly high levels of poverty, indigence, and
unemployment.
In sum, it is hard to conclude that Argentina has finally left its stop-andgo financial cycles of debt accumulation, crises, and restructuring behind.
Argentina’s debt-service schedule, especially in the short- to medium-term,
is hefty; being able to keep up with it depends on maintaining the highly
unequal economic structure of the past decades.

IV. CONCLUSION: WHAT CAN WE LEARN?
Argentina’s experience with debt and financial crises over the last
decades provides important lessons.
1.

Default can be a viable option: Clearly default is not something to
be taken lightly, but it has been and will likely continue to be an
option for sovereign borrowers. The Argentine case shows that
defaulting was not as disastrous as many had predicted. Indeed,
the default helped Argentina to end the unviable fixed exchange
rate regime and it freed up resources to deal with the multiple
dislocations produced by the structural changes that resulted from
the devaluation. Whether the time and resources were put to best
use in Argentina is a different matter, but it is unquestionable that
the default was the correct and most efficient option, given the
circumstances.
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2.

Public debt should be subject to strict scrutiny and rules: This is
fundamental to avoiding excessive indebtedness and financial
cycles and crises, which are costly and undesirable. It is also
fundamental that the process by which a country takes on new debt
be scrutinized by the country’s representative institutions, such as
its congress or parliament, and that new debt be subject to
extensive sustainability analysis.

3.

It is easier to default on foreign lenders than domestic lenders: It is
clear from the government bailouts—of privatized pension funds,
banks, and the corporate sector—that it is easier to default on
foreign bondholders than on domestic bondholders and powerful
economic actors. The reason for this should be clear. The main
consequence of a default on foreign borrowers is political and
perhaps financial. Defaulting on domestic borrowers would almost
certainly have substantial political repercussions, in addition to
severe economic and financial consequences.

4.

Pleasing financial markets should not be the aim of debtrestructuring processes: For a debt-restructuring process to result in
a sustainable and serviceable debt load, it must be based on an
economy that grows thanks to strong internal markets. For this to
take place, it is fundamental to have productive investment and an
equitable distribution of income.
This is opposite to the
Washington Consensus prescriptions, which are centered on
financial liberalization and the free flow of speculative funds.108
Those are precisely the policies that feed the financial stop-and-go
cycles that Argentina has experienced for the last three decades,
the results of which are well known: unsustainable debt loads,
financial crises, defaults, and record levels of poverty and
unemployment.

5.

A return to international capital markets is not a sign of success:
Neither should a return to international capital markets be taken as
a sign of financial health. If debt sustainability is contingent on
renewed access to international capital markets, then most likely,
debt-dependence will not have been fully severed.

6.

Ending financial stop-and-go cycles and debt-led capital
accumulation should become a priority: Argentina is a prime
example of the failure of financial liberalization and “debt-led”
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development policies.109 Since dependence on foreign capital
flows and indebtedness do not lead to sustainable development, it
is of prime importance to abandon these policies in favor of
economic policies that promote sustainable and egalitarian growth.
It is essential to reclaim the language, ideas, theory, and policies of
development economics, which neoliberal economics has
discarded. A strong state, capable of efficiently and effecitvely
intervening in and regulating economic activity, is essential.
7.

Debt restructuring should be approached globally, and not
exclusively as a financial issue: By approaching the debt issue
exclusively in financial terms, Argentina ended up with a debtservice schedule that substantially reduced its freedom to undo the
nefarious legacy of decades of WC-type policies. Furthermore,
Argentina also wasted an opportunity to examine its debtaccumulation process and to make sure those who benefited
unduly were taxed accordingly. These issues should have been
addressed in order to ensure a fairer distribution of the burden of
debt service.

8.

The success of a debt-restructuring process cannot depend on
prolonged, large primary fiscal and trade surpluses: In the
Argentine case, the success of the debt-restructuring process
depends on large and sustained primary fiscal and trade surpluses.
This strategy is questionable and its chances of success are
dubious. First, a large primary surplus drains resources from the
economy that could be used to foster investment and job creation,
and to contribute to a more equitable distribution of income.
Second, economic cycles are endemic to market economies, and
Argentina is certainly no exception. To assume that an economy
will indefinitely have positive growth, in addition to primary and
trade surpluses, is unrealistic. Unfortunately, this is precisely the
assumption made in the government’s sustainability analysis.

9.

The IMF is incapable of predicting financial crises and lacks the
tools or knowledge to deal with a crisis once it erupts: If there is a
lesson that stands out from the Argentine experience, it is that the
IMF does not possess the know-how or the appropriate theoretical
framework to forecast or effectively deal with financial crises. The
IMF’s “one size fits all” approach to economic policy and crisis
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resolution has failed repeatedly around the world. Asian nations
have learned this lesson well and their massive foreign reserve
accumulations now serve as an insurance against ever having to
follow IMF advice again. While reserve accumulation can be
costly, it is bound to be less costly than following the IMF’s
advice.
10. Once the crisis erupted, the IMF was more eager to cash-in and
get out than to provide assistance: After the crisis erupted in
December 2001, the IMF did not provide Argentina with any new
funds.110 Furthermore, the IMF’s efforts appeared to be geared
primarily toward reducing its exposure in Argentina.111
Unfortunately, Argentina did exactly as the IMF expected, using
its Central Bank reserves to cancel its IMF debt in advance.
11. The international financial institutions must be redesigned: The
IMF’s substantial mishandling of the Argentine (and other)
financial crises clearly points to a need for institutional redesign.
The IMF and The World Bank’s grossly mistaken policy
prescriptions point in the same direction. It is clearly necessary to
redesign the IFIs in such a way as to create a true international
lender of last resort that will provide financial assistance to
countries experiencing a crisis. Additionally, IFIs should be
accountable for the policies they prescribe and the results they
produce.
History will tell if the lessons from the Argentine debt debacle will help
to modify the current process of international economic integration, in
particular the development policies of peripheral countries. If debt default
is used simply as a shortcut to return to the liberalized international capital
markets, then clearly not much will have been learned. Rather, the task
ahead should be to define a development strategy that leaves behind the
model of spasmodic debt-accumulation cycles.
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